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awards to separate plots of condemned land, which was required
since the lands were not homogeneous. Therefore, the appellate
division held that the trial court had failed to provide facts which
would permit adequate judicial review, and remanded the case
to the lower court to formulate proper findings of fact. Although
the court indicated its basic reluctance to make findings of fact, it
clearly implied that it would, in appropriate circumstances, exercise
its jurisdiction as a trial court to determine the essential facts itself
under CPLR 4213.243
ARTICLE

52-

CPLR 5201:

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

Debt, a property subject to enforcement.

In the case of Fishman v. Sanders,2" the second department
held that the insurer's contractual obligation in an automobile
liability policy to defend and indemnify the insured is a debt
or cause of action capable of being attached. 245 It thus rejected
the argument that the insured's interest in the policy was purely
contingent. This position was recently reaffirmed in Seider v.
In this decision, however, Judge Ughetta, who had
Roth.24
concurred in Fishman, dissented stating that the court in Fishman
"indulged in erroneous dictum." He remarked that the insurer's
attachable because the indebtedness was not
obligation was not
2 47
absolutely payable.

It has been held, however, that a purchaser's right in airplanes
subject to a conditional sales contract, in which the vendor retained
legal title, was attachable by the vendee's creditors. This was so,
even though the vendor could recover possession of the aircraft
& 2
from the vendee or creditor upon a default in the contract.
The solution to the question of what is contingent and thus not
attachable is not readily ascertainable. In the practical light of
enforcing money judgments, it would appear that if a right or
property is able to be given a monetary value it is sufficiently
243 The appellate division generally confines the exercise of such power to
instances where the record is complete and the missing facts are of a nontechnical nature. See Mellon v. Street, 23 App. Div. 2d 210, 259 N.Y.S.2d
900 (3d Dep't 1965).
244 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2d Dep't 1962).
245 Cf. Matter of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S2d
416 (1962).
240 23 App. Div. 2d 787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1965).
2
47 Id. at 788, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 796. In support of the uncertainty of actual
indebtedness, Judge Ughetta noted that several conditions had to be satisfied
before the policy became effective and that nothing was due under the policy
until the plaintiff recovered a judgment. Ibid.
248 Intermediate Credit Corp. v. Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d
522, 245 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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definite for attachment purposes. Applying this to the conditional
sales contract situation, the debtor-purchaser had a right to possess
the aircraft even though the vendor had legal title. It was this
possessory right for which a monetary value could be determined
and thus it was attachable.
In Seider, the court was not presented with the problem of
determining the worth of the insurer's contractual obligation to
defend and indemnify the insured. It has been suggested, however,
that the premium reflects a minimum value to be accorded to
this obligation. 249 This suggestion fails to consider that the
premium purchases coverage, similar to any consumer item, and
does not reflect in any aspect the actual value of the obligation
to indemnify and defend. In essence, it appears that Judge
Ughetta's objection to Seider is the practical difficulty in fixing
pecuniary value to this obligation. His objection appears to be
well-founded and may find voice in future decisions.
CPLR 5222: Restraining notices- income execution.
A good illustration of the interaction of sections 5222(b)
(effect of restraint), 5205(e) (income exemptions) and 5231(d)
(levy upon default of debtor) is present in the case of Power v.
Loonamn. 250 In this decision the debtor moved to vacate a restraining notice served on his employer. Under CPLR 5205(e), ninety
per cent of the debtor's income is exempt except as to such part
the court determines to be unnecessary for reasonable requirements
of the judgment debtor and his dependents. 25 ' This in effect is
an exception to CPLR 5222(b) which prohibits, once a restraining
notice is served, the transfer of all property or debts in which
the judgment debtor has an interest. If this order were effective
against the employer it would tie up all of the earnings of the
judgment debtor.
In addition, the court noted that CPLR
5231(d) authorizes service of the restraining notice on the
employer only after the debtor defaults in payment or where the
debtor is unavailable to accept service. This affords the debtor
an opportunity to satisfy the judgment before the employer learns
about it.252 In the instant case, the judgment debtor had not defaulted and was available for service. On these grounds, the court
vacated the restraining notice against the employer. The practitioner
248 Matter of Riggle, 11 App. Div. 2d 51, 56, 205 N.Y.S.2d 19, 25 (2d
Dep't 1960), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1962).
25045 Misc. 2d 818, 258 N.Y.S.2d 136 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965).
251 See Widder v. Kaffee, 19 App. Div. 2d 817, 818, 243 N.Y.S.2d 601,
603 (1st Dep't 1963).
2527B McKINNEY's CPLR 5231, supp. commentary 38 (1965).

